Most literature assessing the effectiveness of competition policy focuses on short term impacts, ignoring the likelihood that firms and market mechanisms may take some time to respond to policy interventions. This paper adopts a more dynamic perspective in the context of cartel detection by analysing subsequent developments in market structures through merger. With data for a sample of 84 EC cartels, the paper employs a novel application of recurrent event survival analysis to establish that cartel breakdown is indeed typically followed by intensive merger activity. This is most likely for cartels which had been detected via leniency applications and where concentration was relatively lower. The paper also shows that in most markets where mergers do not occur, the post-cartel structure is already consistent with potential dominance, and in a number of those where it is not, the mergers move the market in that direction. Surprisingly few post-bust mergers were investigated by the competition authority (in this case the European Commission), and this appears to be because many were individually small, but cumulatively had significant impact on concentration.
Introduction
Anti-cartel enforcement is widely heralded as the single most important part of antitrust policy. For this reason it is somewhat surprising that there have only been a few studies analysing how markets react to the elimination of cartels. This paper takes a dynamic approach in examining what happens in markets in the years after a competition authority has successfully prosecuted a cartel. It examines whether markets revert to competitive behaviour or whether …rms …nd alternative ways of reinstating collusive equilibria (short of cartelisation) in the longer run.
The most common approach to this question in the past has been to examine post-cartel prices, and a fairly common method for quantifying cartel overcharge is to compare post-cartel against within cartel period prices. While such an approach can sometimes be illuminating, suitable price data are often unavailable, especially over anything more than the short-term. Here instead we turn to a more indirect approach in order to use types of longer-run data which are more readily available, namely on quantity and market structure. This follows the insight of seminal works in the early 1990s by Sutton (1991) , and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who showed, using very di¤erent analytical approaches, how information about market shares and structure can be informative about the competitive process, even without information on price and pro…ts.
Such market structure changes are often typically achieved in the form of mergers. For this paper, data were collected on mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (hereafter referred to under the catch-all 'merger') between …rms involved in those cartels for which the European Commission (EC) issued decision documents between 1990 and 2012. We pose three questions. Was there more intense merger activity amongst the former cartelists in the years immediately following breakdown? Were certain types of cartels more likely than others to be followed by merger? Is there evidence that the CA subsequently intervened in those proposed mergers which were most likely to raise potential anti-competitive concerns, or is there evidence of deterrence of such mergers?
The task of establishing whether or not there was indeed a higher than normal rate of mergers following breakdown is not straightforward, and the practical and conceptual di¢ culties in applying a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology rule it out in this case. Our alternative is a novel application of survival analysis, with the complication that there may be recurrent deaths (multiple mergers). This establishes that there is indeed evidence of more intensive post-breakdown merger activity, but especially for the subset of cartels which were detected via leniency applications, and in relatively less concentrated markets. Our explanation is that leniency applications are most common in cartels which have already, or are about to, breakdown for 'natural causes'(i.e. are internally unstable). It follows that formal collusion has become unsustainable, and if so it is even less likely that the parties will be able to e¤ectively collude tacitly (without formal communication). Mergers may then o¤er the best prospect for a restructuring which would be more conducive to tacit collusion. However, there is another intuitive explanation of abnormal merger activity post-breakdown in leniency cases -this could be the natural means by which …rms restructure in the face of tougher price competition.
The second part of the paper looks for indirect evidence for discriminating between these explanations. It disaggregates and examines which …rms do the acquiring and who they acquire, in which types of market structure mergers were most common, and what were the implications of the mergers for the post-merger market structures in terms of dominance. It also examines the response of the CA: which mergers it investigated, and what were its decisions. Surprisingly, very few postcartel mergers were intervened by the competition authority, and this appears to be because many were individually small, but cumulatively had signi…cant impact on concentration.
The literature on mergers subsequent to cartel can be traced back, through Bittlingmayer (1985) and Mueller (1996) , to the …rst great merger wave in the US at the beginning of the 20th century, following the Sherman Act prohibition of cartels. Something very similar was observed in the UK following the Restrictive Trade Practices Act in the 1950s. Symeonides'extensive research (e.g. 2002) on this provides more indirect evidence that prohibition of cartels preceded a major restructuring in parts of the UK economy. The main implication for policy makers was highlighted by Evenett et al. (2001 Evenett et al. ( , pp.1245 : "(V)igilance should not end with a cartels' punishment, as former price-…xers often try to e¤ectively restore the status quo ante by merging or by taking other steps that lessen competitive pressures and raise prices."
More recently, two studies have returned to the topic, but at a more micro level within a jurisdiction (the EU) in which cartels are already illegal, and where the event is not some major natural experiment but rather the busting of individual cartels. Kumar et al. (2013) show that for 45% of cartels reported by the EC between 2001-2010, there were mergers between the former cartelists in following years, and that this was twice as likely in markets where buyers were fragmented rather than concentrated. They use this to motivate their theoretical modelling of the choice between collusion and merger when faced with buyer resistance. Hüschelrath and Smuda (2013) also employ a sample of EC cartels. But in their case, the merger data do not relate directly to the cartelists, but rather the amount of aggregate worldwide/EEA merger activity in the industries to which the cartel markets belong. Pooling the industries, they calculate that merger activity was (up to) 83% higher in the 3 years after than in the 3 years before cartel detection.
Our own study is based on a similar sample of EU cartels, and is motivated by the same proposition that merger is a second best which is only pursued once the …rst best (cartel) is no longer possible, but it di¤ers in two important respects. Kumar et al's empirical objective is limited to motivating their theoretical model, establishing whether merger after cartel varies with buyer resistance -they provide no evidence on whether mergers were more prevalent after detection than before. The primary objective of Hüschelrath and Smuda is much closer to ours, but we suggest that their empirical analysis is far too aggregate and casual to justify the conclusions they draw. Their merger data relate not to the cartelists themselves, but to all …rms worldwide in the NACE 3 or 4 digit industries to which the cartel markets belong. So for example, they employ aggregate data on mergers by all …rms worldwide in industries such as "manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations" or "manufacture of other chemical products"to proxy the cartel markets in Europe in …nely disaggregated markets such as Citric Acid or Vitamins. The cartel markets often form only very small proportions of the NACE industries to which their merger data relate. Moreover, all data are pooled across all industries/cartels, there are no controls for mergers in industries in which there were no cartels, and their empirical analysis is con…ned to simple comparisons of two aggregate …gures, before and after, without any tests of statistical signi…cance. Our study is less aggregate, and relates to subsequent mergers between only the former cartelists, and addresses head-on the methodological problem of how best to represent the counterfactual.
Section 2 draws on theory and previous literature to propose the key hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and presents some opening descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 present the main results, using survival analysis of the time series merger data observed at market level, and identifying the sizes of …rms and types of market structure most likely to have mergers. Section 6 explores the policy im-5 plications by examining the CA's merger interventions in these markets. Section 7 concludes.
Restructuring after cartel breakdown
Drawing from the previous literature, this section …rst identi…es two alternative explanations for merger activity following cartel breakdown. These provide two main hypotheses which are testable with the data at our disposal.
Two competing explanations
The 'anti-competitive'explanation is that, post-cartel, the now frustrated cartelists attempt to re-instate 'soft'competition. This necessitates a new market structure via merger which is conducive to soft rather than intense competition. Soft competition might be tacit collusion or some form of leadership, in which respective cases, the mergers would have coordinated or unilateral e¤ects.
On the other hand, under the 'e¢ ciency'explanation, the cartel breakdown has the desired objective from the CA's perspective, leading to a change in prevailing conduct from collusion to competition: price falls, the market restructures and marginal …rms exit, and some of the exit is via acquisition by other members of the cartel. For example in a free entry model, replacing collusion with, say, Cournot or Bertrand competition will lead to a reduced number of …rms (Sutton, 1991, section 2.2, pp.28-37) , and in an asymmetric market the ones that exit are the least e¢ cient …rms (the smallest in Cournot). Alternatively, if the post-cartel equilibrium is still tacitly collusive, price is lower than under cartel, so even in this case the likelihood of marginal exit through merger remains.
With a well-informed and diligent CA, the latter explanation should dominate. 6
The revealed preference argument
Most of the existing literature described above has focused on the anti-competitive motive, employing what we refer to as revealed preference type reasoning. 1 In principle, …rms in any market choose between competing and colluding. In turn, collusion might take the form of hard-core cartel, or it might be softer -tacit collusion or price leadership. In order to achieve and sustain soft collusion, market structure must be right, and this may require mergers between at least some of the …rms. The choice may be constrained by the basic demand, cost and entry conditions, which may e¤ectively preclude any form of collusion, and the presence of the CA may deter either cartel formation and/or anti-competitive mergers.
In the case of a cartelised market, collusion is clearly feasible, and …rms have revealed a preference for formal over tacit collusion. Thus the revealed preference argument has two steps:
(a) The cartel solution dominates soft competition via merger. Were this not so, …rms would have opted for mergers in place of a cartel in the …rst place.
(b) Once the cartel option is removed, …rms turn to the second best -tacit collusion or price leadership -and this may require restructuring through merger.
However, there are two important quali…cations to this logic.
Merger may not be necessary
First, without disputing (a), this need not imply (b): with the cartel option no longer open, mergers may not always be necessary in order to achieve the second best of tacit collusion. Much of the conventional theory of collusion can be applied equally to -and does not always distinguish between -tacit collusion and cartels. For example, the basic predictions of the repeated game -that collusion is more likely the fewer is the number of …rms and the more symmetric they are -are invoked in both the literatures on cartels and coordinated e¤ects mergers.
This raises the question of why …rms sometimes choose to overtly collude when tacit collusion is also possible and does not carry the same risk of sanctions? Harrington (2012) o¤ers one explanation -given symmetric …rms, he shows that the pro…t from tacit collusion has an upper bound which is the cartel pro…t, so where the cartel option is chosen, it follows that cartel pro…t must exceed tacitly collusive pro…ts su¢ ciently comfortably to exceed the expected cost of detection.
However, given that the cartel has been chosen but is now busted, it might still be pro…table and sustainable for the …rms to switch to the second best, even without merger. There is some evidence to suggest that this is exactly what happens in some cases. Harrington (2004) refers to the idea of 'residual collusion', where a busted cartel is followed by tacit collusion. Connor (2001) uses the same argument to explain what happened in the aftermath of the exposure of the Lysine cartel. A study by Kovacic et al. (2007) on prices in the post-breakdown period for di¤erent types of vitamins implies a simple switch to tacit collusion in some cases. They …nd that vitamin products with two conspirators continue as if the explicit conspiracy never stopped, while products with three or four conspirators return to pre-conspiracy pricing, or lower. This is also con…rmed in an experimental setting by Fonseca and Normann (2012) , who …nd that, after formal communication is no longer possible, '…rms'carry on successfully colluding in small numbers cases. If this previous communication is a su¢ cient condition to sustain tacit collusion, then we would expect at least some markets to still display collusive outcomes after cartels are detected, without any change in market conditions (structure, entry conditions, etc).
Nevertheless, there are important di¤erences between explicit and tacit collusion -the cartel has organisational and communication advantages, and without these, collusion may not be possible. So although collusion may sometimes continue in tacit form post-breakdown without merger, in other cases, the existing market structure cannot support collusion without formal communication, and in those cases part (b) of the above argument remains valid: re-structuring by merger is necessary to 8 facilitate a collusive outcome given no communication, and larger numbers.
Cartels which die a ' natural death'
Second, part (a) of the argument need not always apply. While this may be reasonable if the cartel has been detected ex-o¢ cio, i.e. through the CA's own detection activities sometimes stimulated by customer complaints, if it has already broken down before detection by the CA (i.e. died a 'natural death'), it follows that collusion is no longer sustainable even with communication, and we can no longer infer that cartel is preferred to merger at the time of breakdown. By extension, in these circumstances it is also unlikely that tacit collusion is sustainable either, and it follows that merger is even more necessary.
In other words, while mergers may sometimes be unnecessary for tacit collusion where the cartels remained 'e¤ective' (in terms of stability and high price) at the time of detection, they are more likely in those which had already failed.
Empirically, a frequent signal that a cartel has e¤ectively already died a natural death is detection via a leniency application, and we exploit this fact in the following empirics.
Testable hypotheses
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
H1
The probability of merger will be higher in the years immediately following cartel breakdown.
This follows from either of the competing explanations. Because cartels that have already died before the start of the CAs investigation are not sustainable at the time of breakdown a further speci…cation follows:
H1a
H1 is especially pronounced for cartels having died a natural death before detection.
However,
H2
The probability of merger is lower, ceteris paribus, in concentrated markets.
This follows because markets which are already concentrated: (i) are more likely to be able to sustain subsequent tacit collusion without merger, (ii) will include fewer …rms, so there are fewer opportunities to merge, and (iii) are more likely to be deterred by the fear of CA merger intervention.
This hypothesis can be re…ned by disaggregating 'concentration': in a statistical sense, the concentration of any size distribution depends on the number of …rms (inversely) and the asymmetry in their market shares (positively) 2 .
H2a
The probability of merger is lower in small number markets; and
H2b
The probability of merger is lower in more symmetric markets.
Assuming tacit collusion is more likely where …rms are of roughly equal size, further mergers may be unnecessary for tacit collusion, but are also more likely to be deterred for fear of CA intervention under a coordinated theory of harm. 3 Where size asymmetries are large, this implies the presence of a dominant …rm and, without the organisational advantages of the cartel, mergers may be necessary to consolidate the leader's position. 4
These are the core hypotheses of the paper, but additional institutional characteristics should also be relevant, for example, the nature of the agreement and organisation of the cartel. These are devices designed to facilitate coordination within the cartel, and without them, uncoordinated collusion may be impracticable. We capture this empirically below by distinguishing cartels which were market-sharing as opposed to price-…xing. Some forms of market sharing (notably territorial and/or customer allocations) are largely self-enforcing because defection is transparent, and if so, the same should be true for tacit collusion. We also identify whether or not the cartel had a ringleader -if so, it is less likely that collusion could survive a cartel bust and implicitly the loss of its leader to monitor and enforce, without restructuring.
Data and descriptive statistics
The data, as summarised in Table 7 in the Appendix, contains information on both cartels and mergers.
The cartels
The dataset draws on decision documents published by the European Commission (EC) since 1990. The useable sample is 84 cartels that were detected between 1984 and 2009 -the published report typically lags the date of detection by one or more years. 5 36 cartels (43%) broke down before they were detected, and most of these (31) were detected under leniency. On average, the cartels had lasted over 8 years at time of breakdown, and covered 84% of the market (the remainder being supplied to increase asymmetry. Andreoli-Versbach and Franck (2013) show that in the Italian retail petrol market price leadership work only after the market leader introduced a policy of sticky prices. Harrington (2006) suggests that it is typically one …rm who undertakes the price and quantity monitoring tasks in a cartel. by outsiders and imports). 82% colluded on price …xing and 70% employed market sharing practices; more than half (52%) combined both practices. Bid rigging as well as speci…c quota allocations were more common practice in larger cartels (with 10 or more …rms). Ringleaders were identi…ed in one third of cartels (see Davies and De, 2013) .
The mergers
The cartels involved a total of 593 …rms at the dates of breakdown. Data was collected on all mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures between former cartelists from the same cartel. 6 The sources were: (i) companies' websites, in particular annual reports, press releases, investor information, company timelines/histories, etc.; (ii) merger decisions documents published by the European Commission; 7 (iii) National Competition Authorities (CA); and (iv) business and …nancial websites (e.g. Bloomberg, etc.).
In almost exactly half (41) of the cartels, the breakdown was followed by one or more mergers between previous cartelists. In these, there were 128 qualifying mergers, 8 (on average 3.12 per cartel, and the mode was 1, but the distribution is highly skewed, with as many as 19 transactions between cartelists in one extreme case).
50% of mergers occurred within 5 years of cartel breakdown. Figure 1 plots the cumulated number pooled across all cartels with time measured after cartel breakdown. In aggregate (bold line), the rate of increase is higher within the …rst …ve to seven years, but slows down thereafter.
The …gure also disaggregates by leniency/non-leniency detection. Post-breakdown mergers in leniency cases occur on average 43 months after cartel failure, compared to 97 months in non-leniency cases. The concavity of the curve is more pronounced in leniency cases, and this provides an early sign that …rms tend to engage in merger activity most intensively relatively soon after breakdown -especially for cartels detected under leniency.
However, this …nding should be treated with caution for two reasons. First, given that the population of all …rms (and thus all potential mergers) must decline over time due to exit by acquisition, this curve does not necessarily imply concavity in the merger rate. Second, due to variability across cartels in the year of breakdown, there is also heterogeneity in the composition of the pool -later observations are based on increasingly fewer cartels. These limitations motivate our use of the hazard curve technology in the next section. 9 The above statistics on cartel characteristics are familiar and typical for samples such as this, 10 but in addition, we have also collected useable data on market shares of the individual cartelists in 64 of the cases, 11 using sources such as (i) cartel and merger decision documents published by the EC and national CAs (ii) companies' annual reports (iii) reports and information issued by relevant trade/industry associations and market intelligence …rms/platforms (iv) business and …nancial websites etc. 12 Using these estimated market shares, the HHI index at the time of breakdown for each cartel was also computed, 13 as were its two constituent parts, …rm numbers (n) and the coe¢ cient of variation (CV ).
Empirical analysis
We …rst explain why an orthodox di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) approach, comparing post-and pre-breakdown using control markets to represent the counterfactual, will be inappropriate. The reasons are both practical and conceptual. In this context, 'pre' would be either the cartel period itself, which would not be an appropriate representation of what might happen in a 'competitive'world, or the period before cartel formation, which would require extensive historical data collection -for some markets many decades before the availability of internet sources. Second, choice of appropriate control markets for such a large sample is problematic. There would be prohibitive costs in collecting comparable data, given the very disaggregated market de…nitions of most cartel markets, and the absence of detailed sources such as the EC cartel decision documents which are the key source for our cartel markets. Moreover, the most appropriate control markets, in terms of demand and cost conditions, would almost certainly lie within the same 3 or 4 digit industries as the cartels, and therefore very often be populated by the same large diversi…ed multinationals as the cartel markets or even operate under the cartel's umbrella.
Even putting aside these generic issues which confront many applications of DiD, two further features of the present context would constrain its e¤ectiveness. First, the data here are right censored: the merger history in each market is only observed up to the common year of observation (2013), whilst the start date di¤ers between cartels, de…ned by their breakdowns, so we have relatively little data on more recent cartels. Second, because we focus on mergers between the former cartelists, with each successive merger, there are fewer …rms remaining who can merge.
To address these issues we employ a methodology based on an application of survival analysis. Survival analysis originates from health applications in which the event of interest is time until failure (perhaps the malfunctioning of some medical device, sometime after its original …tting), here, 'failure'is de…ned by merger. 14 One comparative advantage of survival models is that they allow the analysis of censored observations. At the heart of survival analysis is the hazard (intensity) of an event at time t given the event history and characteristics of the context. Here, time starts at the date of cartel breakdown, the event is merger, and the context is the market. As a hazard function is conditional on previous event history, it is an obvious tool to be used in a situation where successive mergers leave fewer and fewer …rms to merge in the future.
The central hypothesis -more intensive merger activity after breakdown -can be tested by examining the behaviour of the hazard curve over time. The counterfactual in this case would be a constant hazard rate which is undisturbed by the event of cartel breakdown. On the other hand a monotonically declining hazard rate in the years after breakdown would indicate a stimulus to merger which then gradually subsides over later years.
The survival model
If there was only one post-cartel merger in each market the analysis would reduce to a standard application of single-event survival analysis requiring an examination of the distribution of the duration between cartel breakdown and the merger, and the shape of the corresponding hazard curve. Any distribution that can have an increasing, decreasing, or constant hazard function could be used for this purpose (for example the Weibull or gamma distributions). Because of its simplicity, we employ the Weibull distribution, for which the hazard is:
and are conventionally referred to as the shape and scale parameters of the distribution. The parameter captures the pace of merger activity, and in crossindustry analysis this will allow the underlying magnitude of merger activity to di¤er between markets. If = 1 the hazard is constant, with < 1 it is monotonically decreasing, and with > 1 it is monotonically increasing. Therefore our hypothesis that merger activity in the years immediately following cartel breakdown is more intense can be tested by:
However, we wish to allow for multiple mergers in each market, and this requires a modi…cation of this model to allow for recurrent events. To illustrate, Figure 2 plots the history of a given industry with three mergers on the central line. To allow for recurrent events (here, subsequent mergers) the previous literature 15 most commonly uses one of two main options depending on the assumption about when individuals (industries) are entered into the risk set (i.e. exposed to the risk of a merger). First (shown below the central line), time is measured from the previous event. In this case, the …rst interval starts at breakdown and subsequent intervals are measured from the preceding merger. Second, (shown above the central line), each interval is measure from the start (cartel breakdown.)
Thus, depending on how intervals are treated, there are three alternative ways of approaching our research question. Firstly, one could ignore recurrent events and focus only on the rate at which we observe the …rst merger following a cartel (irrespective of how many mergers are to follow). We refer to this as the 'naive' model as it discards important information on subsequent mergers. Secondly, in allowing for recurrent mergers one could assume that the waiting times between mergers are independent and thus, for every merger, time scales from the preceding event (renewed entry). This would be appropriate if every subsequent merger is a reaction to the preceding merger and not to the cartel breakdown. As such, this model allows for mergers to endogenously trigger subsequent mergers. 16 Thirdly, one could assume that waiting times between cartel breakdown and each merger are independent -i.e. every merger is timed from the start of the study (entry at start). This would imply assuming that every merger -no matter how late it occurs -is a reaction to the cartel breakdown and not to the preceding merger.
Following conventional notation in recurrent event analysis 17 denote the merger 16 By looking at how the probability of subsequent mergers change in light of previous merger history. For a theoretical discussion of endogeneous mergers see Qiu and Zhou (2007) or Gowrisankaran (1999) . 17 For example a comprehensive treatment of recurrent event models in the area of biostatistics is given by Cook and Lawless (2007) . event history in any market by N (t) = fn(u) : u tg, where n(u) is the number of mergers in [0; t). 18 We also allow for the possibility that hazard rates are a function of market and cartel characteristics (denoted by X). Then the hazard (intensity) function is:
By combining (1) and (2) the above three scenarios can be modelled in the following way:
1. 'Naive'model: h(t j X) = t 1 .
2. Renewed entry model: h(t j N (t); X) = (t t n(t) ) 1 . This follows Andersen and Gill (1982) and the …rst model in Prentice et al. (1981). 19 3. Entry at start model: h(t j N (t); X) = t 1 . This model is loosely based on the second model in Prentice et al. (1981). 20 Models 2 and 3 can be thought of as setting two bounds on the estimate of when multiple mergers can happen in an industry. In Model 2 each industry spends a relatively shorter time in the risk set (time starts at previous event), which means that we are more likely to have many short spells and few long spells in the sample, implying that should be the lowest in these models. In Model 3 mergers that happen later are treated as independent, therefore the analysed time spells are more likely to be longer, implying a higher . Now consider the implication for a sample of m industries, when the set of all industries is fG 1 ; G 2 ; :::; G m g. Denote the total number of mergers in industry G i (i = 1; 2; :::; m) by k i . Allowing for right-censoring in each industry there are s i = k i + 1 intervals in each industry. For each interval denote the total number of industries at risk by m s , and the number of industries with mergers by r s .
Let t s1 ; t s2 ; :::; t srs ; t + srs+1 ; :::; t + sms be the ordered failure (merger) times in interval s, 21 with P s 1 r s exact times, and -because the study period has a natural cuto¤ point at the time of writing this study -we also have P s 1 (m s r s ) right-censored intervals. The likelihood of observing this sequence is given by:
Where the density function f (t) represents the information that can be obtained from observed uncensored survival times and the survival function S(t) captures observed right-censored times.
Using the Weibull density ( t 1 e ( t) ) and survival functions (e ( t) ) together with (3) the recurrent event, right-censored likelihood functions to be estimated for the three models described are given below. For each model we assumed that the sample is progressively censored (i.e. markets are entered at di¤erent times and the study lasts a predetermined period of time).
In the naive model there is only one interval analysed, therefore the ordered survival data is: t 1 t 2 ::: t r ; t + r+1 ; :::; t + m and the likelihood of observing this data given a Weibull distribution is:
In the renewed entry model denote the gap time between two events in the same industry by u s = t s t (s 1) . In this case the ordered (observed and censored) gap times are given by: u s1 u s2 ::: u srs ; u + srs+1 ; :::; u + sms and the likelihood function:
In the entry at start model the ordered survival data is: t s1 t s2 ::: t srs ; t + srs+1 ; :::; t + sms and the likelihood function is:
As the emphasis is on estimating initially we estimate and without allowing for heterogeneity across cartels. 22
Results
The MLE estimates of for Models 1-3 are reported in Table 1 . 23 The 'Full sample' column shows that < 1 in all three models, but only at the 90% con…dence level for Model 3. 
Result 1 (H1):
There is higher merger activity in the years immediately following cartel breakdown, although the power of the test that con…rms this depends on model choice.
However, when the model is estimated only for cartels detected under leniency ('leniency only' column), MLE estimates of are lower and signi…cantly less than unity in all three models:
Result 1a (H1a)
For cartels that died a natural death, there is signi…cantly higher mergers activity 24 in the years immediately following, and this is robust across all model treatments.
Allowing heterogeneity across industries
The above results are conditional on the Weibull parameters being constant across all industries. This assumption is now relaxed by allowing the underlying merger rate to vary across industries, using an exponential link function: = e 0 x i (t j ) , where x i is a vector of covariates. The model is speci…ed such that is constant (i.e. covariates do not a¤ect the shape only the position of the hazard function).
To test hypothesis H2 in Section 2.3, estimates now control for market structure (HHI, or n and CV ), the type of the cartel agreement (price …xingpf or market sharingms), and whether there was a ringleader at the time of cartel breakdown (rl). Table 2 reports estimates for the two alternative recurrent event models 2 and 3. In Variant A HHI is used as a control for market structure; this is replaced by n and CV in Variant B.
The results for variant A in Table 2 show that estimates for the shape parameter remain in the same range as above, i.e. signi…cantly less than unity.
Result 1b (H1 and H1a):
There is robust evidence of higher merger activity following the natural death of cartels when also allowing for heterogeneity across markets.
Since HHI has a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient in all model speci…cations:
Result 2 (H2):
The underlying merger rate is lower in more concentrated markets. 24 In fact, this result holds at the 99% con…dence level. This may imply that …rms in more concentrated markets are more likely to be deterred from merging (as there is a higher chance of regulatory disapproval), but it can also mean that these markets are already su¢ ciently concentrated to sustain tacit collusion. The results do now allow us to distinguish between these two possible explanations.
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Results 2a and 2b (H2a and H2b):
Market asymmetry and a larger number of …rms both lead to an increased underlying merger rate.
This follows from the variant B results: in markets with symmetric structure the merger rate is less intensive following cartel breakdown, and higher if there are more …rms in the market. These again may be due to deterrence (high symmetry and few …rms typically imply less likely merger approval) or due to the fact that these markets are already conducive to collusion. 25 The results on the other covariates show that in general having a previous ringleader in the cartel reduces the rate of mergers following cartel breakdown, and that market sharing cartels have higher merger rates after the cartel. These results are robust across all speci…cations. 26 5 Mergers: competitive consequence or secondbest collusion?
These results support both main hypotheses of section 2.3, but they cannot discriminate between the two competing explanations -e¢ ciency or anti-competitive. In any cross-section as such, it is likely that the relative strengths of the two will vary between cases, and this will be examined in future work on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, a preliminary screening is possible here making use of the data we have collected on the individual mergers and market shares of merging …rms.
As explained earlier, such data are available for 72 of the mergers in 64 of the cartels. 27 In order not to attach undue reliance on market share estimates of smaller …rms, we employ a simple dichotomy: distinguishing the two largest, 'leading', …rms from the others for each of these cartels. Using information only on the shares of the two leaders (S 1 and S 2 ), three types of market structure can be distinguished:
If S 1 > 0:5 'single dominance'(SD) If S 1 < 0:5 but S 1 + S 2 > 0:5; 'collective dominance'(CD) If S 1 + S 2 < 0:5; 'no dominance'(ND)
This typology corresponds broadly with traditional de…nitions of market dominance often used in the competition policy literature.
Tables 3 and 4 report the frequencies of merger by …rm types, and cartels by market structures respectively, and they provide the following four descriptive insights. Figures in parentheses are expectations on the null that there is no association between …rm identity and propensity to merge, using the mean number of leaders (2) and others (6.3) per cartel.
Finding 1:
Leading …rms are disproportionately more involved in mergers.
According to the e¢ ciency explanation, we would expect most exit by acquisition to involve marginal …rms, and if merger control deters large …rms from merger, we would expect few to involve leaders. However, assuming that 'marginal' …rms are typically from the 'other'group, the results in Table 3 o¤er little support for these expectations. There were 7 mergers between the two leaders in a previous cartel; and where one of the parties was an 'other', more often than not its partner was a leader rather than another 'other' (36 compared to 29). More formally, if these observed frequencies are compared with expectations based on a null hypothesis of no association between …rm type and propensity to merge, the null is rejected at the 0.05 level.
Finding 2:
Most markets include dominant …rms at the time of breakdown. Table 4 reveals that in 60% (39/64) of the cartel markets, there was dominance by either the leading (SD) or, more often, the two leading …rms (CD) at the date of breakdown. This is unsurprising -cartelised markets tend to be concentrated -but it nevertheless highlights that mergers in markets such as this would usually attract the attention of competition agencies -even without knowledge of any prior cartel activity. Finding 3:
Mergers are less frequent in markets with dominant …rms, but nevertheless still occur in 30% of such cases.
There were mergers in 80% of the ND markets, but in only 33% of the CD markets, and 1 SD market (Table 4 column 2). This is consistent with the results on concentration from the survival analysis, and is broadly consistent with the deterrence expectation. Nevertheless, there were mergers in 12 of the markets with already dominant …rms, and close CA scrutiny would be expected in those cases.
Finding 4:
Mixed evidence on the likely impact on market structure.
The last three columns of Table 4 are in transition matrix form, showing how the mergers would impact on the structure of the market, if not intervened by the CA. 28 28 Post-merger market shares and structures are computed following conventional CA practice 25 (In those markets where there was more than one merger, this is their cumulated e¤ect.)
As already noted there were mergers in 20 of the 25 markets which were ND at the time of breakdown. Of these in 12 the impact was insu¢ cient to create dominant …rms, but in 8 the e¤ect would be to move the market to collective dominance. It is these 8 markets which, at least potentially, correspond to the anti-competitive explanation of merger activity, and which con ‡ict with the expectation that the threat of CA intervention will be su¢ cient to deter such mergers. 29
The response from competition authorities
It is not the primary purpose of the current paper to exhaustively evaluate the EC's merger control subsequent to cartel investigation, but both Findings 3 and 4 would lead us to expect considerable CA merger control activity in a number of markets (those involving already dominant …rms or creating dominance.) Therefore, we have identi…ed how many mergers were actually investigated by the Commission, and what were its decisions (Table 5 ).
In fact, only half (41) of the 83 mergers for which we have su¢ cient market share data were investigated by the EC or a national CA 30 . Of these, most (34) were cleared without remedies, and of the 7 where remedies were agreed, only 1 had any impact on the cartel market, whilst the other 6 only impacted on the parties'activities in other markets.
The table reveals that this relative inactivity is largely explicable by the 'small' in merger investigations -the market share of a newly merged …rm is assumed to be the combined shares of the two merging parties. This is subject to two obvious quali…cations: (i) most oligopoly theory suggests that following merger, any nearly merged …rm will raise price and contract scale rather than maintain it at the combined pre-merging scales of the parties, (ii) we abstract from any other changes in market structure which are independent of the merger. 29 The Table also shows that there is one market in which there was already CD, but mergers would increase the share of the larger leader, such that it would become SD. 30 For this part of the analysis, we also include 13 cement mergers. These were excluded from previous Tables, because we were unable to estimate the market shares for all …rms, and therefore the cartel HHI. However, we do know the shares of the merging parties, and this is su¢ cient to compute the change in HHI. size of most of the mergers. Nearly all, or perhaps all 31 of the 42 un-investigated mergers involved a turnover below the EC's minimum disclosure threshold, and in 30 of the 41 cases which were investigated, the increase in concentration implied by the merger would have been lower than the level identi…ed in the EC's merger guidelines as signi…cant ( HHI<250). 32 These …ndings are at least super…cially encouraging (for the CAs), but they seem to be inconsistent with …ndings 3 and 4. However, the explanation becomes clear by focusing on 8 markets in which mergers introduced collective dominance where previously it was absent, and one where single dominance replaced collective dominance (Table 6) .
Here, intervention was indeed minimal: of the 24 mergers, only 7 were investigated and only 1 required a remedy. However, as can be seen, these were multi-merger markets (on average 2.67 per market), and the changes in structure recorded in Table 4 re ‡ect the combined e¤ect of all mergers in each market. While all 17 31 In Table 5 , we have been unable to identify the aggregate turnovers of the parties in 6 mergers, and it is likely that none of these was 'large'; if so, all 42 un-investigated mergers were below the EC turnover threshold. 32 Computed from our estimates of the market shares of the merging parties. 17 10 * This was the last of the three mergers which triggered the move from ND to CD, but HHI < 250. ** This was initially picked up as an antitrust case and the EC granted exemption for the JV which it later renewed before …nally approving the concentration. *** The remedy was a large divestment (approx. 1/3 of acquired company) to new entrant. un-investigated mergers was 'small' relative to the EC's turnover threshold, taken together their e¤ect was to reinforce the dominance of leading …rms. Moreover, in 7 of the 17, we estimate that, even when treated separately, the merger had more than a trivial impact on concentration ( HHI>250). This evidently occurs in those cases where the cartel market, often de…ned very narrowly, is small relative to the merger size threshold.
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Conclusions and directions for further research
The main …nding of this paper is a con…rmation that after a cartel breaks down, typically, there is increased merger activity amongst the former cartelists. This evidence therefore reinforces the more aggregate historical evidence drawing on natural experiments of periods when cartels became prohibited. The novelty of the paper lies not so much with the headline result, but more with the application of survival curves to handle the problem that we have di¤ering post-cartel periods for di¤erent cartels and that for some at least no mergers have yet been observed.
The increased merger activity post breakdown is most pronounced in those cartels which are detected under leniency. In that these are 'failed' cartels this might be evidence that …rms use merger to re-instate a structure which facilitates (now tacit) collusion. Similarly a disproportionately high number of acquisitions are undertaken by the leading …rms.
Nevertheless, the …ndings of the paper could be consistent with either the e¢ciency explanation -cartel breakdown sti¤ens competition and this forces weaker …rms to exit -or a collusive explanation -with the cartel option denied, …rms strive for tacit collusion via merger. A more detailed look at market share changes caused by mergers suggests that both explanations might be at work in some markets, however, on balance they point towards the 'anti-competitive'explanation.
Turning to the paper's policy relevance, a cross-market study of as many di¤erent markets as this is not well-suited to de…nitive conclusions, and the purpose of the paper was not to conduct an exhaustive evaluation of the e¢ cacy of EC merger control. Future in-depth case analysis will be required for that purpose.
Nevertheless, some relevant results have emerged. Of particular interest are the markets where post-breakdown merger activity is least pronounced (or even nonexistent). These tend to be highly concentrated, with only a few relatively symmetric …rms. This could be because second best tacit collusion is already attainable without merger. But it could be that …rms in such markets are deterred from proposing mergers which they know will be blocked. However, deterrence does not seem to have been e¤ective in the subset of markets in which mergers did occur and appear to have resulted in a structure where the leading …rms emerged as dominant. In a number of the markets, mergers are relatively frequent, and, although each one might be small, they do involve the leading …rms, and when taken together their combined e¤ect is to increase dominance. Super…cially at least, this tends to undermine the deterrence argument. It also points to a doubt concerning the use of size thresholds in merger control: a sequence of relatively small mergers may have a signi…cant deadening impact on competition, even although none in itself seems signi…cant. This possibility is particularly pronounced where the markets themselves are small -as is the case for many cartels.
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A Obtaining MLE of and
For Model 1 the MLE of and can be obtained following procedures on parametric censored survival models, such as Lee and Wang (2003, p.178) . In previous literature we did not …nd derivation of the MLE of the two Weibull parameters in the two recurrent-event models used in this paper therefore we brie ‡y report how the Model 3 estimates were obtained (Model 2 is derived analogously but time is measured by u s = t s t (s 1) ). Denote the set of estimable parameters by = f ; g, then the loglikelihood function is given by :
For l 3 ( ) the MLE of and can be obtained by solving the following two equations simultaneously: There is no closed solution for this system so iterative techniques a lá Newton-Raphson were used.
The 95% con…dence intervals given in Table 1 were obtained using: where Z 0:025 is the 0.975 percentile point of the standard normal distribution.
v and v are the two diagonal elements of an adjusted covariance matrix. Lin (1994) showed that the covariance matrix given by I 1 = @ 2 l( b )=@ @ 0 does not take into account the additional correlation in the data due to the potential lack of independence among mergers in the same industry. Therefore it is not appropriate for testing or constructing con…dence intervals for recurrent event data. proposed dealing with this in the following way. Divide the sample into m industries fG 1 ; G 2 ; :::; G m g, and denote the matrix of the group e¢ cient score residuals by G, which has dimensions m 2 because there are m industries and 2 parameters to be estimated. Then the robust covariance matrix is given by: 
